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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tony Sallings contends the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his
petition for post-conviction relief, as he had alleged a genuine issue of material fact
regarding his trial counsel’s failure to impeach the credibility of the confidential informant
(hereinafter, CI).  Specifically, he alleged the CI, whose testimony was critical to the
State’s case, should have been impeached regarding information that she had stolen
some of Mr. Sallings’ property after the alleged drug deal in this case, and trial counsel
had won the right to address that issue in his cross-examination of the CI in a ruling in
limine.  He also alleged that, had trial counsel done so, the jury would not have
convicted him.  Therefore, this Court should reverse the order summarily dismissing
Mr. Sallings’ petition and remand this case for further proceedings.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Sallings filed a petition for post-conviction relief following his conviction at trial
for delivery of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.  (R., pp.61-64.)  He alleged,
inter alia, that his trial counsel’s performance had been objectively deficient because
trial counsel had not impeached the CI’s credibility with information that she had stolen
some of his property despite a ruling in limine which permitted him to do so.  (See, e.g.,
R., p.9 (“He did not ask any questions pertaining to the CI stealing my belongings which
the court allowed him to do.”)1; accord. R., pp.28, 58, 63, 77.)  He also alleged several
issues related to the CI’s credibility, including that she had been allowed to search parts
1 To the extent possible, spelling and other grammatical mistakes have been corrected
when quoting Mr. Sallings’ pro se filings.
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of her clothing herself as a part of the pre-deal search, and that the officers had all lost
sight of her car during part of the alleged deal.  (See, e.g., R., pp.35-36, 78.)   As a
result, he alleged trial counsel’s deficient performance in not impeaching the CI’s
credibility with the stolen property information was prejudicial because, had trial counsel
done so, the jury would not have convicted him.  (R., pp.59-60, 79.)
The district court appointed post-conviction counsel, who framed that issue this
way:
This evidence and the act of theft is appropriate impeachment of this
witness on her truthfulness.  The District Court ruled that counsel could
inquire on that issue however, he failed to do so at trial.  It was ineffective
assistance of counsel on his part not to inquire into that area.  It would
obviously go to the truthfulness of [the CI] and her motive to potentially
fabricate her testimony, so that Mr. Sallings would be incarcerated and
she would have access to his property.
(R., p.126.)
The State moved for summary dismissal of the petition, and in that motion,
invited the district court to take judicial notice of the underlying criminal file.  (R., p.147.)
The district court implicitly did so, as, during the hearing on the State’s motion for
summary dismissal, it reviewed the transcript of the jury trial proceedings.2  (See, e.g.,
Tr., p.5, Ls.7-11, p.9, Ls.3-5.)  In reviewing the ruling in limine on whether defense
counsel would be allowed to impeach the CI’s credibility with the stolen properly
information, the post-conviction court concluded:  “the Court made its ruling related to
2 Since the district court implicitly took judicial notice of the documents and transcripts in
the underlying criminal record, a motion for this Court to take judicial notice of those
same documents has been filed contemporaneously with this brief.  References to the
documents and transcripts from the underlying criminal file will be identified as “Supp.”
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that, and Defense Counsel adhered to the Court’s ruling.”  (Tr., p.8, Ls.22-23.)
Specifically, the trial court had held:
But at least in this moment in time for the parties to rely on the
Court’s thinking I understand what the allegation is and the dates that
involve the allegations, there are Rules [of Evidence] -- 608 particularly b
that is involved in this analysis and then of course we have 401, 402 and
403 all giving the Court consideration and how they apply to the one other.
I’m comfortable in denying the request [to impeach the CI] under
the Rules for the purpose of motive, which would fall under 404 as another
wrong act.  However, based upon the way this has been presented to the
Court, I am comfortable, at this stage, allowing the defense to cross-
examine the witness regarding the manner and questions relating to the
witness’s possession of the property.  I think it does, in the Court’s mind,
relate to truthfulness and untruthfulness.
As I then go back to 403 as to whether it should be excluded . . . I
think that protects the parties as to the limits that the Court would place
under 608(b) which is that there are no specifics allowed.  However, on
cross-examination, the Court will allow that to be inquired into and then
once, as [the prosecutor] suggested, once that response is elicited then
the defense would have to move onto the next question.
(Supp. Tr., p.96, L.8 - p.97, L.9.)  No further clarification of that ruling was sought or
provided.  (See generally Supp. Tr.)  Defense counsel did not ask the CI any questions
about the stolen property during cross-examination.  (See generally Supp. Tr., pp.179-
95.)
Because it concluded trail counsel’s inaction had been due to the trial court’s
ruling in limine, the post-conviction court found no deficient performance in trial
counsel’s failure to impeach the CI with the stolen property information.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.22-
23, p.9, Ls.3-10.)  It also concluded Mr. Sallings had failed to allege prejudice arising
from counsel’s failure to cross-examine the CI about the stolen property.  (Tr., p.9, L. 11
- p.10, L.1.)
Finding no genuine issues of material fact in Mr. Sallings’ petition for post-
conviction relief overall, the district court granted the State’s motion for summary
4
dismissal.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.14-19; R., p.164.)  Mr. Sallings subsequently filed a notice of
appeal, which was filed premature to the final judgment.  (R., pp.159-60, 166.)
5
ISSUE




The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Sallings’ Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief
A. Standard Of Review
Post-conviction cases are civil in nature. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153
(2008).  In post-conviction cases, a petition may be summarily dismissed only if it does
not present a genuine issue of material fact. Id.; see I.C. § 19-4906(b).  In determining
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, “[a] court is required to accept the
petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true . . . .” Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153;
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995).  Additionally, during the summary
judgment phase, the courts “liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party,” in this case, Mr. Sallings. Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho
878, 881 (Ct. App. 2008); accord. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004)
(“[I]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the petitioner.”).  When a genuine issue
of material fact exists and would, if resolved in the petitioner’s favor, entitle the petitioner
for relief, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at
153; Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518 (1998).
To show a genuine issue of material fact in regard to a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel’s
performance fell below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was prejudiced by
that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004).  In regard to the second prong of the
Strickland test, a petitioner shows prejudice when he demonstrates that there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, or, in other words,
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he must undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010).
B. Mr. Sallings’ Allegations Established A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact In Regard
To His Trial Counsel’s Failure To Impeach The Credibility Of The CI With The
Stolen Property Information
Mr. Sallings alleged his trial counsel had been ineffective because he had not
impeached the CI’s credibility with the information that she had stolen some of his
property after the alleged drug deal.  (See, e.g., R., pp.77, 126.)  The post-conviction
court held there was no genuine issue of material fact in that regard for two reasons:
(1) there was no deficient performance because “the Court made its ruling related to
that, and Defense Counsel adhered to the Court’s ruling” (Tr., p.8, Ls.22-23); and (2)
Mr. Sallings had failed to allege prejudice resulting from that error.  (Tr., p.9, L. 11 -
p.10, L.1.)  The district court’s conclusions in both regards are erroneous, as both are
disproved by the record.
1. Mr. Sallings’ Sufficiently Alleged Trial Counsel’s Performance Was
Objectively Deficient
First, the post-conviction court’s conclusion – that trial counsel adhered to the
trial court’s ruling on the impeachment evidence – is clearly erroneous. See, e.g.,
Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325 (2003) (reaffirming that the appellate court will
set aside factual findings of the district court when they are not supported by
substantial, competent evidence).  The trial transcript clearly shows that the trial court
authorized trial counsel to engage in that line of cross-examination and that he failed to
do so.  As a result, the post-conviction court’s conclusion that Mr. Sallings had failed to
show deficient performance on that basis is erroneous.
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Specifically, the trial transcript shows that, while the trial court decided counsel
could not get into the stolen property information as evidence of motive under I.R.E.
404(b), it expressly stated, “on cross examination the Court will allow that to be inquired
into,”  pursuant to I.R.E. 608(b) because that information was relevant to the CI’s
truthfulness.  (Supp. Tr., p.96, L.12 - p.97, L.9 (emphasis added).)  Despite that express
authorization to cross-examine the CI on that topic, trial counsel did not ask the CI any
questions about the stolen property.  (See generally Supp. Tr., pp.179-95.)  Therefore,
the post-conviction court’s conclusion – that trial counsel had simply adhered to the trial
court’s ruling – is clearly erroneous and should be disregarded.
Given the trial court’s actual ruling in limine, Mr. Sallings raised a genuine issue
of material fact under the first prong of the Strickland test by alleging “trial counsel did
not ask any questions pertaining to the CI stealing my belongings which the courts
allowed him to do.” (R., p.9; accord., e.g., R., p.126.)  Trial counsel’s failure to impeach
a witness constitutes deficient performance when that failure results from inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other objective shortcomings. See, e.g.,
Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 705 (Ct. App. 2015).  In Bias, for example, the post-
conviction record included an affidavit from trial counsel in which he explained he had
not impeached the witness in the manner alleged by the petitioner because trial counsel
lacked a factual basis for doing so, and the petitioner had presented no evidence
contradicting that assertion. Id. at 705.  Thus, in that circumstance, the record showed
no deficient performance. Id.
Unlike in Bias, there was no indication that Mr. Sallings’ trial counsel had a
legitimate tactical reason for not impeaching the CI with the stolen property information.
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That is particularly evident from the fact that trial counsel not only fought for, but actually
won, the right to present that evidence in the ruling in limine.  Furthermore, Mr. Sallings
actually identified the factual basis for that line of questioning, as he alleged the
prosecutor was aware of several people who could testify to the relevant facts.
(R., p.28; see also Supp. R., p.76 (the State’s motion in limine identifying those
people).)  Therefore, the reasonable inference is that trial counsel was aware of those
persons, and thus, the factual basis for impeaching the CI on the stolen property
information.  As such, the record shows trial counsel’s deficient performance was not a
tactical decision, but rather, was the result of ignoring the law of the case as it was set
forth in the ruling in limine, or of other objective short comings.  That means
Mr. Sallings’ allegations established a genuine issue of material fact under the first
prong of the Strickland test on this claim.
2. Mr. Sallings Sufficiently Alleged Prejudice Resulting From Trial Counsel’s
Deficient Performance
The post-conviction court’s second reason for summarily dismissing this claim –
that Mr. Sallings failed to allege prejudice resulting from the alleged deficient
performance (Tr., p.9, L.11 - p.10, L.1) – is similarly disproved by the record.
Mr. Sallings expressly alleged prejudice arising from trial counsel’s deficient
performance in this regard by alleging that, had trial counsel impeached the CI’s
credibility with the stolen property information, the jury would not have returned a guilty
verdict.   (See R., pp.59-60, 79; see also R., p.126 (post-conviction counsel noting the
case should proceed to an evidentiary hearing for “a determination by the Court as to
the impact such testimony could have had on the jury verdict”).)  To that point,
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Mr. Sallings alleged various facts which show that the CI’s testimony, and thus, her
credibility, were critical to the verdict rendered.
This case began when the CI called Mr. Sallings to try to set up a controlled drug
buy.   (See Trial  Exhibit  2  (recording  of  the  phone call).)   Officers  testified  that  a  man
subsequently approached the CI’s car and got in.  (Supp. Tr., p.128, Ls.8-9.)  The CI
then drove to a different parking lot across the street, and while the officers could still
see the car, they could not see what specifically was happening inside the car.  (See
Supp. Tr., p.129, Ls.16-18, p.210, L.11 - p.211, L.11, p.231, Ls.16-25.)  However, that is
where the CI testified Mr. Sallings placed the baggie of drugs on the center console,
and she gave him cash.  (Supp. Tr., p.173, L.23 - p.174, L.5; see also Trial Exhibit 3
(recording from a wire the CI was wearing).)  The CI then drove to a third location,
behind a strip mall catty-corner to the second parking lot.  (See Trial Exhibit 14 (map of
the area in question marked by witnesses during their testimony).)  The officers lost
sight of the car behind the strip mall.  (See Supp. Tr., p.131, Ls.4-9, p.211, Ls.15-20,
p.233, Ls.2-5.)  There, she let Mr. Sallings out of her car before driving to a different
location for debriefing.  (Supp. Tr., p.174, L.9 - p.175, L.5.)
Mr. Sallings alleged, as there had been no female officer present, Officer
Godrey’s pre-deal search of the CI had included having the CI do a cursory self-search
of parts of her clothing, such as her bra and waistband areas. (See, e.g., R., pp.12, 22-
23, 35-36.)  He also alleged Officer Godfrey had not verified that cursory self-search via
a drug dog sniff.  (See, e.g., R., p.36.)  The trial transcript bears out Mr. Sallings’
allegations.  Officer Godfrey testified that, while he had checked the CI’s pant legs and
coat pockets, he had the CI “kind of shake [her bra] out to make sure she wasn’t
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concealing anything.  And then run her thumbs around her waistband and kind of shake
her pants out.”  (Supp. Tr., p.118, Ls.12-18.)  He also admitted that, while he assumed
the CI had a purse, she had not brought it out of the car with her when talking to him, it
was possible she had left it in the car, and he had not searched a purse before the
alleged deal.  (Supp. Tr., p.148, Ls.17-23, p.159, L.21 - p.160, L.10; see generally
Supp. Tr. (including no testimony regarding whether the CI’s purse was actually
searched pre-deal).)  Mr. Sallings also alleged the drugs found were in a little baggie
roughly the size of a postage stamp, and which weighed only 0.93 grams including the
bag itself.  (R., p.36; Supp. Tr., p.155, Ls.10-18; see also Supp.  R.,  Trial  Exhibit  1
(picture of the baggie).)  Based on these facts, Mr. Sallings was alleging the CI could
have concealed the drugs from the officers before the deal, and thus, framed him.  (See
R., p.36.)
That allegation is important because Mr. Sallings also alleged that all three
officers lost sight of the CI’s car during the course of the alleged deal, specifically, when
it went behind the strip mall.  (R., p.19.)  Again, that allegation is supported by the
record.  (Supp. Tr., p.131, Ls.19-23, p.211, Ls.15-20, p.233, Ls.2-5 (each of the officers
testifying that he lost sight of the car at that time).)  That is important since the CI let
Mr. Sallings out of the car behind that strip mall.  (Supp. Tr., p.174, Ls.8-20.)  Therefore,
the facts as alleged by Mr. Sallings and borne out by the record reveal that, not only
was the CI the only witness who could actually tie Mr. Sallings to the drugs, but also that
she had the opportunity, when no one else could see her, to plant the drugs in her car.
What that means in the post-conviction context is that the facts alleged by Mr. Sallings,
which were not refuted by the State, show a reasonable possibility that, had trial
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counsel impeached the CI’s credibility with the information about the stolen property, the
jury would have found her testimony not credible, that it was a story made up to cover
her attempt to frame Mr. Sallings, and so, gain access to his property.  (See R., p.127.)
Therefore, not only did Mr. Sallings expressly allege prejudice on this claim, his
allegations established a genuine issue of material fact under the second prong of the
Strickland analysis.
Since the facts alleged by Mr. Sallings show genuine issues of material fact on
both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of the Strickland analysis in regard
to  his  claim  of  ineffective  assistance  of  trial  counsel  for  failing  to  impeach  the  CI’s
credibility with the stolen property information, the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Sallings respectfully requests this Court reverse the order summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 24th day of January, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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